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Geography alone would give Russia a prominent role in 
the Korean peninsula. The Russian Federation currently 
shares a recently demarcated 17-kilometer common bor-
der along the Tumen River with the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea (DPRK).1 The proximity is suffi cient 
to ensure that Russian leaders closely follow events in the 
Koreas and try to infl uence developments. In addition, 
the histories of the Russian and Korean nations have in-
tertwined for centuries. The Soviet Union created North 
Korea and imparted the new state with its horrifi c Stalin-
ist political-economic model. Although Russian-DPRK 
relations have atrophied since the USSR’s demise, ties 
between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Ko-
rea (ROK) have improved considerably in recent years.
Russia pursues a variety of goals with respect to the Ko-
reas. In the economic realm, Russian entrepreneurs en-
visage revitalizing ties with the DPRK by converting it 
into a transit country for Russian energy and economic 
exports to South Korea and other countries in the Asia-
Pacifi c region. Among other benefi ts, the resulting com-
mercial surge would help integrate Russia further into the 
prosperous East Asian region and promote the economic 
recovery of the Russian Far East, which lags behind 
western Russia economically and is becoming a security 
liability owing to the demographic collapse of the ethnic 
Russian population in the Russia-China border regions.
In the area of security, Russian policymakers are eager 
to normalize the security situation on the Korean penin-
sula in order to realize their economic ambitions there. 
Specifi c Russian goals include ending the DPRK nuclear 
weapons and missile programs, averting the abrupt col-
lapse of the DPRK regime or a nuclear or ballistic missile 
proliferation wave in East Asia, and keeping Moscow a 
major regional security actor. Common Russian tactics 
or precepts to pursue such ends include inducing North 
Korea to end its disruptive nuclear and missile programs vol-
untarily through economic assistance and security assurances, 
maintaining a prominent role for Russian diplomacy through 
joint declarations and other means, promoting dialogue rather 
than punishment and keeping any needed sanctions limited, and 
encouraging all parties to adhere to their commitments.
History
The Soviet Union created the DPRK by establishing a sepa-
rate communist state, led by Kim Il-sung, in the northern half 
of the Korean peninsula when Soviet forces occupied the re-
gion following Japan’s surrender in the summer of 1945.2 Fol-
lowing the end of World War II, the Soviet Union provided its 
new ally with economic and military assistance.3 During the 
1950–53 Korean War, the USSR and the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), then ideological allies, jointly backed the DPRK 
regime with armaments, military advisers, and, in the case of 
China, hundreds of thousands of armed “volunteers.” Until the 
Soviet Union’s demise in 1991, state-to-state relations between 
the USSR and the DPRK were supplemented by ties between 
their ruling communist parties. After the Sino-Soviet alliance 
collapsed in the late 1950s, Moscow and Beijing competed for 
infl uence in Pyongyang. Nonetheless, both governments were 
frustrated with the unpredictable and refl exively xenophobic 
North Korean leadership, which continually made foreign and 
domestic policy decisions without securing Moscow’s or Bei-
jing’s approval. It was not unusual for the DPRK to take sig-
nifi cant foreign policy actions—such as confronting the United 
States or the ROK—without consulting or even notifying So-
viet leaders. The DPRK had its own concerns about the USSR, 
especially Soviet efforts to promote pro-Moscow factions in 
Pyongyang and a perceived willingness to sacrifi ce Korean 
interests when they came into confl ict with other Soviet pri-
orities.4 The DPRK balanced relations with its two great-power 
patrons, receiving aid from both without committing to either. 
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Today, Pyongyang still prefers to deal with Russia and 
other countries bilaterally rather than collectively.
During most of the 1990s, the new Russian Federation 
under President Boris Yeltsin shunned the DPRK while 
pursuing better ties with the ROK. The reorientation ac-
tually began during the last few months of the Soviet 
Union. In September 1990, the Soviet foreign minister, 
Eduard Shevardnadze, shocked his hosts in Pyongyang 
when, during a visit to the DPRK, he announced that the 
Soviet Union would establish diplomatic relations with 
the ROK and demand that the DPRK pay market prices 
for Soviet goods using hard currency.5 The DPRK could 
not afford the new prices, and the resulting suspension of 
Soviet oil deliveries infl icted a brutal blow on the North 
Korean economy, which until then had oriented about 
half of its trade with the Soviet Union, receiving large 
quantities of petroleum and other raw materials at subsi-
dized prices.6 From 1992 to 1997, bilateral Russia-DPRK 
trade turnover shrank eightfold.7 Russia ceased provid-
ing economic aid, subsidized arms sales, or other spe-
cial benefi ts to the DPRK, which could no longer appeal 
to Marxist-Leninist ideological solidarity when Russian 
leaders, excluding a few admiring hard-line communists, 
professed to adhere to democratic or, increasingly, prag-
matic nationalist principles.
Russia-ROK ties did improve during the 1990s. In 1990, 
President Roh Tae-woo rewarded the Soviet government 
with a $1.5 billion loan for recognizing the ROK; this 
followed from his policy of Nordpolitik, which sought 
to normalize ROK relations with the DPRK’s key al-
lies, the USSR and the PRC, in order to gain leverage 
over Pyongyang.8 Roh then hosted President Mikhail 
Gorbachev on the South Korean resort island of Jeju in 
April 1991. Yeltsin visited Seoul the following year, and 
President Kim Young-sam, Roh’s successor, traveled to 
Moscow in 1994.9 The leaders of Russia and South Ko-
rea have met more than 20 times—on the sidelines of 
multinational gatherings as well as bilateral summits in 
each other’s countries—since the two countries estab-
lished diplomatic relations in 1990.10 But, during the fi rst 
decade of their new relationship, Moscow’s limited le-
verage in Pyongyang and weak national economy even-
tually limited South Korean interest in deepening ties 
with Russia.
Lacking close ties with either Korean state, Russia’s 
status regarding the peninsula’s security affairs deterio-
rated during the 1990s to that of an interested observer.11 
Moscow played only a small role during the fi rst Korean 
nuclear crisis in 1993–94. Despite its pioneering involve-
ment in North Korea’s nuclear energy program, Russia 
did not join the new Korean Peninsula Energy Develop-
ment Organization (KEDO) consortium, a multinational 
arrangement established to construct two light-water re-
actors as part of the 1994 Agreed Framework ending the 
crisis. Russia also stood aside during the four-party talks 
among China, the United States, and the two Koreas that 
began in September 1997. Moscow declined to renew the 
1961 Soviet-DPRK Friendship and Mutual Assistance 
Treaty, which had a military intervention clause, when it 
expired in September 1996.
Yeltsin’s successor, Vladimir Putin, sought to reestablish 
Russia’s infl uence in East Asia, including in North Ko-
rea, as part of his broader ambition to reestablish Russia 
as a great power. Whereas Yeltsin’s government shunned 
Pyongyang in a generally unsuccessful effort to court 
Seoul, the Putin administration pursued balanced rela-
tions with both Korean states.12 In February 2000, Rus-
sia and the DPRK signed a new Treaty on Friendship, 
Good-Neighborly Relations and Cooperation. That July, 
Putin became the fi rst Russian (or Soviet) leader to visit 
Pyongyang, where he signed a new Russia-DPRK coop-
eration treaty that provides for consultations in the case 
of mutual threats. When Kim Jong-il proposed in April 
2002 holding a three-way summit with Russia and South 
Korea in Siberia, the gesture suggested that Putin’s rap-
prochement efforts with Pyongyang had made signifi cant 
headway.13
Russia has also deepened commercial relations with the 
ROK, partially compensating for its constrained econom-
ic ties with China and Japan. At their September 2008 
summit in Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev 
and ROK President Lee Myung-bak agreed to upgrade 
their bilateral ties to that of a “strategic cooperative part-
nership.” Although Russia’s economic role on the Kore-
an peninsula lags behind that of many other countries, its 
status as a full partner in international efforts to resolve 
the DPRK nuclear crisis ensures that Moscow enjoys 
considerable infl uence on Korean security issues. 
Current Security Issues
Six-Party Talks
Russia has been a participant, along with North Korea, 
South Korea, China, Japan, and the United States, in the 
six-party talks that, since 2003, have been seeking to se-
cure an end to the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program in 
return for various economic, diplomatic, and other incen-
tives. The four interconnected objectives of the talks are 
eliminating nuclear weapons from the Korean peninsula, 
normalizing relations between the DPRK and all the 
other parties, securing the economic development and 
regional integration of North Korea, and achieving an 
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enduring peace on the Korean peninsula and the broader 
East Asian region.14 The talks have been characterized 
by the old Leninist slogan, “One step forward, two steps 
back,” except it seems that nine steps back occur for ev-
ery ten steps forward, with the walker frequently appear-
ing ready to drop dead en route. The parties were able to 
secure a denuclearization agreement at the end of the fi fth 
round of the talks, which ended on 13 February 2007.15
Under its terms, North Korea pledged to shut down and 
eventually dismantle its Yongbyon nuclear complex in 
return for food, economic aid, and the prospect of nor-
malizing relations with the fi ve other countries. Despite 
some progress in 2007 and early 2008, progress stalled 
from mid-2008 to mid-2009 for reasons that appear relat-
ed to the political succession transition in North Korea.
At present, the DPRK regime is bargaining hard for con-
senting to return to the six-party talks. DPRK representa-
tives have conditioned rejoining the talks on achieving 
further progress in Pyongyang’s bilateral dialogue with 
Washington. Russian offi cials, though welcoming bi-
lateral discussions between North Korean and U.S. of-
fi cials, have described them as helping resume the talks 
rather than replacing them, a development that would 
weaken Russian infl uence in the negotiations.16 They 
have also supported continuing existing international 
sanctions against the DPRK pending its compliance 
with various UN Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 
mandating its cessation of sensitive nuclear activities 
and launches of ballistic missiles.17 The DPRK has twice 
before (2004–05 and 2005–06) boycotted the talks for a 
year until the other parties, especially Beijing and Wash-
ington, made suffi cient concessions to entice Pyongyang 
to rejoin them. Whatever the costs this time for drawing 
North Korea back, the price for securing the elimination 
of the DPRK’s arsenal, if this remains possible, is likely 
to be even higher.
Ballistic Missile Problems
The DPRK’s ballistic missile program, originally based 
on Soviet-era weapons technology, has presented another 
major security problem for Russia and other countries. 
North Korea’s improving ability to target more missiles at 
more countries, as well as its seeming willingness to sell 
missiles and missile-related technologies to any foreign 
buyer, has alarmed much of the international community, 
especially its neighbors. The ballistic missile issue as-
sumed renewed importance in both 2006 and 2009, when 
Pyongyang’s decision to resume testing its long-range 
ballistic missiles led the UNSC to impose sanctions on 
North Korea. In turn, the DPRK responded on each oc-
casion with aggressive rhetoric and the testing of a nu-
clear weapon. Although North Korea has received much 
criticism for its characterizing a thinly disguised ballistic 
missile program as a space exploration program, South 
Korea has been developing its own rocket capability with 
considerable Russian assistance. For both Koreas, their 
space programs are deeply tied up with intrapeninsular 
rivalry and global prestige.18
The most recent missile crisis arose on 5 April 2009, 
when North Korea launched a rocket that closely re-
sembled its Taepo-dong-2 missile. When the DPRK was 
visibly preparing to resume launching long-range ballis-
tic missiles before April under the guise of testing space 
launch vehicles, its fi ve main negotiating partners and 
other countries threatened and pleaded with Pyongyang 
to refrain from such action. The United States and its al-
lies argued that the launch would violate a UNSC ban on 
DPRK missile-related activities and threatened to impose 
new sanctions should the launch occur. Seeking to avoid 
another round of sanctions, Chinese and Russian offi cials 
urged North Korean restraint. The DPRK ignored these 
and other international entreaties and warnings. Despite 
the relatively mild UN action that followed, which con-
sisted of a denunciatory statement read by the rotating 
UNSC president, the DPRK responded to the UNSC 
presidential statement by announcing it would perma-
nently withdraw from the six-party talks. It subsequently 
detonated another nuclear device.
Economic Issues
Russian and North Korean offi cials have discussed vari-
ous economic deals, notably some linking a trans-Korean 
railroad with Russia’s rail system. The construction of 
such a rail link would allow Russia to become a tran-
sit country for South Korean trade with Europe, which 
now involves mostly ocean shipping. Furthermore, Rus-
sian planners want to construct energy pipelines between 
Russia and South Korea across DPRK territory. The 
implementation of these proposals awaits normalization 
of the security situation on the Korean peninsula. Until 
then, Moscow’s economic ties and infl uence in Pyong-
yang will lag far behind South Korea’s and especially 
China’s, which provides North Korea with most of its 
foreign assistance, including energy, food, and other key 
commodities. The DPRK can survive even in the absence 
of economic ties with Russia; China’s economic assis-
tance is indispensable.
Even with the persistent security tensions, economic co-
operation between Russia and South Korea has increased 
dramatically during the past decade. The commerce in-
volves primarily the exchange of Russian oil and natural 
gas in return for ROK machinery and equipment. The 
South Korean military also purchases some Russian de-
– 4 –
fense equipment. The two governments are seeking to 
deepen their bilateral economic cooperation as well as 
extend it into other sectors.
North Korea
The direct Russian economic stake in the DPRK is mini-
mal. Unlike China, Russia no longer provides direct eco-
nomic assistance to North Korea. Soviet leader Mikhail 
Gorbachev’s decision to convert all Soviet trade with so-
cialist countries to a hard-currency basis, a practice con-
tinued by the Yeltsin administration, precipitated a sharp 
deterioration in commercial exchanges between the two 
countries. Under Putin, Moscow suspended all military 
and nuclear energy cooperation with Pyongyang in line 
with international norms and sanctions.19 Although eager 
to exploit profi table opportunities, Russians generally 
approach their commercial relations with the DPRK ex-
clusively from a market cost-benefi t, which considerably 
constrains economic ties.
Until recently, a major obstacle to greater Russia-DPRK 
economic ties was the large debt that North Korea accu-
mulated during the Soviet period. For years, North Ko-
rean negotiators indicated they wanted Moscow to write 
off the entire $8 billion debt.20 The Russian government 
proposed various alternative debt settlement options to 
the DPRK, including exchanging the debt for investment 
or tangible property, but the North Koreans rejected these 
arrangements.21 Russian negotiators eventually agreed to 
waive most of the debt as an incentive to secure Pyong-
yang’s return to six-party talks and to eliminate an ob-
stacle to future economic cooperation.22
In contrast with Russia’s border with China, the Russia-
DPRK border is usually sealed. In November 1998, Rus-
sia, China, and North Korea signed a treaty to demar-
cate their territorial waters on the Tumen River, which 
marks the borders of the three countries.23 In August 
2001, DPRK leader Kim Jong-il made headlines when 
he crossed through the border post of Khasan in an ar-
mored train en route to a 10-day visit to Moscow and 
St. Petersburg. Along with China, Russia does support 
the free economic trade zone in the port city of Rason.24 
Both Russia and China have aggressively developed sup-
ply routes to this city, with Russia investing at least $72 
million as of early 2008 to restore its trans-Siberian rail-
road route and China making its own bid for the future 
trade volume with the construction of a new highway to 
complement its existing rail networks.25 In 2009, Rus-
sia went further and pledged to spend $201.8 million to 
restore the railroad and renovate the city’s largest port.26 
In early January 2010, Kim Jong-il visited the zone and 
designated Rason a “special city.”27
The level of bilateral trade, which predominately in-
volves Russia’s eastern regions, barely exceeded $200 
million in 2006.28 Russian policy is to not sell defense 
or nuclear energy items to North Korea, and China pro-
vides the DPRK with many other imports at subsidized 
prices. In recent years, Pyongyang’s main export to Rus-
sia has been labor. Thousands of North Korean workers 
are employed in Russia’s timber and construction indus-
tries. They provide one of the few means the DPRK has 
to earn foreign currency besides exporting weapons and 
inviting foreign companies to set up shop in North Ko-
rea, both of which are risky strategies since they expose 
the regime to external sanctions and internal democratic 
contagion, a fear that has impeded South Korean com-
panies employing North Korean workers at the Kaesong 
industrial complex.
According to one Russian source, each of the 5,000 
North Koreans in Vladivostok, who usually receive fi ve-
year visas, sends the DPRK government approximately 
$800 every month. Anything they earn beyond that, such 
as by undertaking odd jobs for local Russians, they can 
keep for themselves.29 In addition, more than 1,000 North 
Koreans work in a network of remote logging camps in 
Russia’s Amur region, which is more than 1,500 kilome-
ters from the Russia-DPRK border. The camps are run 
by a Russian company that shares its proceeds with the 
North Korean government. These laborers tell reporters 
that they earn a few hundred dollars each month. Some 
complain that they are not paid regularly and they must 
work all day in unbearably cold weather with little to 
eat and with frequent work-related injuries and deaths. 
Thousands of North Korean laborers have reportedly de-
serted such camps during the past two decades. Some are 
lucky to fi nd a sympathetic Russian family to stay with 
or gain the support of Russian human rights groups, but 
then they live in constant fear of being arrested and de-
ported to North Korea.30
Despite the low level of recent Russia-DPRK commerce, 
Russian policymakers and entrepreneurs have visions of 
transforming North Korea into a pivotal player in their 
vision of reviving the Russian Far East and integrating 
Russia more deeply into the prosperous Asia-Pacifi c 
region. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and other Rus-
sians hope that the six-party talks can resolve the Ko-
rean nuclear dispute and establish peace and prosperity 
on the Korean peninsula, spurring “the development of 
Russia’s Far East and Siberia regions.”31 The DPRK’s 
continuing frictions with the international community, 
however, have blocked the potentially lucrative projects 
under Russian consideration.
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South Korea
Russia-ROK economic relations have improved consid-
erably since the end of the Cold War. Trade between Rus-
sia and South Korea amounted to $9.3 billion in 2006, up 
from $2.8 billion in 2001.32 By 2008, bilateral trade had 
reached $18.4 billion, a 22.4 percent increase from 2007. 
Although the fi rst half of 2009 saw a 52 percent decline 
in trade owing to the global fi nancial crisis, further joint 
projects and mutual investment—ROK direct investment 
in Russia exceeded $731 billion in the fi rst quarter of 
2009—in petrochemicals, automobiles, and other sectors 
should soon produce a rebound in bilateral commercial 
ties as the crisis recedes.33 
An important Russian objective is to secure ROK in-
vestment in the Russian Far East, a region rich in natu-
ral resources but lacking in people, infrastructure, and 
commerce. Seeing a natural partnership between ROK 
technologies and Russian resources, the Russian govern-
ment has agreed that South Korea can construct a port 
and an industrial park near Vladivostok for exclusive 
use by ROK companies, marking the fi rst time Moscow 
has agreed to build an such a  complex for one country’s 
exclusive use.34 The memorandum of understanding en-
visaging the creation of the complex states that the par-
ticipating South Korean fi rms would receive special tax 
benefi ts and exemptions from bureaucratic “red tape.”35 
ROK companies expect to win major contracts to help 
Russia develop the infrastructure needed for the Asia-
Pacifi c Economic Cooperation forum that will occur in 
Vladivostok in 2012.36
Although the Russian and ROK economies are close in 
aggregate size, the two countries have strengths in dif-
ferent economic sectors.37 For the most part, South Ko-
reans import Russian oil and natural gas while selling 
Russia ROK-made machinery and equipment. Ties have 
been growing in various high-technology sectors. In June 
2009, the Russian ambassador told the Korea Times that, 
“From sea to the land and outer space” the two countries 
“have cooperated in all fi elds.”38 More than half of South 
Korea’s civilian helicopters are Russian made, while 
Russia provides ROK nuclear power plants with more 
than one-third of their fuel.39 
Another exchange involves defense products and servic-
es. Russia has supplied tanks, combat vehicles, military 
helicopters, and other defense equipment to the ROK 
armed forces as partial payment of Russia’s $2 billion 
debt to the ROK.40 The debt originated in 1991, when the 
Roh Tae-woo administration extended $1 billion in bank 
loans and a $470 million commodities loan in partial 
reward for the Soviet Union’s recognition of the ROK 
government the previous year. The subsequent collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the impoverishment of the new 
Russian Federation made it impossible for Moscow to 
repay the loans in cash. The fi rst two so-called “Brown 
Bear” arms-for-debt swap deals, negotiated in 1995 and 
2003, included T-80U Tanks, METIS-M anti-tank mis-
siles, BMP infantry fi ghting vehicles, Kamov Ka-32 
transport helicopters, and Murena-E hovercraft. 
Russian and ROK representatives are now negotiating 
another arms deal using a different arrangement. Instead 
of another arms-for-debt swap, South Korea will instead 
purchase any military equipment and technologies it ac-
quires outright, while Russia will repay the remaining 
$1.3 billion debt over the next decade. The two sides have 
yet to resolve which defense items to include in their next 
transaction. Whereas the Russian government wants to 
provide already manufactured weapons systems as in 
the two previous deals, South Korean negotiators now 
want Russia to transfer sophisticated defense technolo-
gies as well as turn-key weapons. The current technolo-
gies under discussion range from submarine fuel cells, 
long-range radar systems, to systems designed to defend 
electronics against an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) at-
tack.41 The two governments are also seeking to expand 
their economic cooperation into other sectors, including 
nuclear energy and other high-technology areas.42
ROK-Russia commerce has proven especially important 
for some companies. For example, the Hyundai Group 
last fall was selling more cars in Russia than any other 
fi rm, accounting for 9.4 percent of the market share, 
while the giant Korean business conglomerate also buys 
coal from Russia and runs farms on Russian territory.43 
In the fall of 2008, Hyundai agreed to form a strategic 
alliance with the Russian private equity fi rm, Industrial 
Investors, to pursue energy, social infrastructure, and 
transportation development opportunities in Russia.44 
Hyundai executives are expanding their collaboration in 
other high-technology areas.45 Samsung has also begun 
to emerge as a major high-technology player in Russia. 
Since September 2009, the company has made its high-
speed wireless Internet technology available across Rus-
sia. On 7 October 2009 it agreed to help expand the cut-
ting-edge wireless network WiMAX to 38 more Russian 
cities in cooperation with the Russian provider, Yota.46 
Building on their success in Russia, the two companies 
are now launching WiMAX in Nicaragua and announced 
their intentions to expand WiMAX service further across 
Central and South America as well as into eastern Eu-
rope.47 Other profi table joint Russian-ROK business ven-
tures have arisen in shipbuilding, oil development, and 
the uranium mining sectors.48
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Russian-ROK economic ties would surge if they realized 
their ambitious plans for massive transportation and en-
ergy projects, including a trans-peninsular gas pipeline 
and a rail network that would connect the Trans-Siberian 
Railway and the Trans-Korean Railway.by linking Rus-
sia’s Khasan, the North Korean border town of Tuman-
gang, and China’s Tumen.49 The rail project would boost 
trade by decreasing transportation costs and delivery 
time. May 2007 saw the fi rst test run of two passenger 
trains across the Korean Demilitarized Zone; the experi-
ment was repeated six months later with a ROK cargo 
train.50 In April 2009, a Russian company and a Chinese 
fi rm signed an agreement to complete the railway. Before 
the onset of the latest nuclear crisis, they had hoped a 
North Korean company would join them in May 2009. 
The construction of such a link would allow Russia to 
become a transit country for South Korean trade with 
Europe, which now fl ows mostly by ocean shipping.51 
Furthermore, Russian planners want to construct energy 
pipelines between Russia and South Korea across North 
Korean territory.52 Russian policymakers describe their 
involvement in these regional economic projects as con-
tributing to regional peace and security as well as pros-
perity. With reference to these ventures, Gleb Ivashents-
ov, until recently Russia’s ambassador to Seoul, asserted 
in January 2009 that “there is no better way than long-
term economic projects to rebuild trust between North 
and South Korea.”53
When President Lee visited Moscow in September 2008, 
Russia and the ROK signed a massive natural gas deal 
estimated to be worth $90 billion. According to its provi-
sions, South Korea will import 10 billion cubic meters of 
Russian gas annually during a 30-year period beginning 
in 2015.54 An October 2006 Russian–ROK gas coopera-
tion agreement authorizes Russia’s state-controlled Gaz-
prom and South Korea’s state-run Korea Gas Corpora-
tion (Kogas) to oversee Russian natural gas deliveries to 
South Korea.55 The two conglomerates initially intended 
to construct a $3 billion overland pipeline running from 
Vladivostok in Russia’s Far East through North Korea to 
South Korea. Kogas estimated that the ROK will import 
approximately 20 percent of its natural gas needs in 2015 
from Russia.56
Plans for such an overland pipeline originated years ear-
lier but have faced repeated diffi culties owing to com-
mercial infi ghting among Russian energy companies, the 
inability of Russia and China to negotiate a mutually ac-
ceptable agreement that would allow Russia to send gas 
to both the PRC and the ROK, and North Korea’s erratic 
position on the trans-peninsular pipeline project. The 
new, conservative ROK government of President Lee, 
which has adopted a more skeptical view of economic 
cooperation with the DPRK, has recently encouraged 
consideration of alternative pipeline routes that would 
bypass North Korean territory. Ambassador Ivashentsov 
said, “It will be cheaper but we can’t make our joint proj-
ect a hostage to North Korea. We have encountered such 
problems with Ukraine, . . .” The ambassador was allud-
ing to the interruptions of Russian energy deliveries to 
European countries whenever an energy confl ict arises 
between Russia and Ukraine. Ambassador Ivashentsov 
refl ected Russia’s genuine apprehension about making 
Russia-ROK ties depend on the DPRK when he added, 
“From Russia’s perspective, Ukraine is a more predict-
able partner than North Korea.”57 Despite its higher 
costs, Gazprom and Kogas have discussed the possibil-
ity of building an underwater pipeline connecting Vladi-
vostok with either Samcheok on South Korea’s east coast 
or Busan, the largest port in the ROK.58 Its prospects are 
uncertain as it might prove less expensive to simply ship 
the gas.59 On 29 August 2009, Kogas announced that, un-
less North Korea explicitly requested that the pipeline be 
built on its soil, the company would discard the project in 
favor of importing additional gas in liquefi ed form from 
Russia by ship.60
At present, the ROK imports almost all its natural gas in 
liquefi ed form.61 South Korea currently pays remarkably 
low prices for the liquifi ed natural gas (LNG) it acquires 
from Russia’s Sakhalin gas reserve. A 2004 agreement 
between Russia and the ROK established that South Ko-
rea would import 1.5 million tons of LNG annually over 
a 20-year period starting in 2009. The terms set the price 
at $25 a barrel, which roughly equated to the correspond-
ing cost of a barrel of crude oil in 2004. In 2009, Russia 
asked to renegotiate the deal owing to the surge in oil 
and LNG prices in recent years, but the ROK has insisted 
on adhering to the conditions stipulated in the original 
agreement. Russian negotiators may offer the ROK more 
joint energy development opportunities or other incen-
tives to agree to amend the 2004 price formula.62 
Russia has also helped the ROK further its space explo-
ration ambitions. In 2004, the Russian government ne-
gotiated a $250 million deal to help develop the Korea 
Space Launch Vehicle 1 rocket.63 In a disappointment for 
the program, the summer 2009 satellite launch proved to 
be a failure because of technical diffi culties arising from 
South Korea’s design work (the Russia-designed fi rst 
stage of the KSLV-1 reportedly worked fl awlessly).64 De-
spite this setback, Russia is contracted for a second and 
a third launch and will continue to play a crucial role in 
Korea’s space program by providing advanced technolo-
gies not yet available in South Korea. The recent launch 
also allowed Russia to test the fi rst stage of its Angara 
rocket, which has been in development for more than 10 
– 7 –
years and is expected to make its fi rst multistaged fl ight 
in 2011.65
Whatever their mutual economic benefi ts, these bilateral 
commercial relations provide both Russia and South Ko-
rea with leverage in their relations with other parties. For 
example, ROK economic ties with Russia, as with China, 
help shape Moscow’s and Beijing’s policies toward the 
DPRK. From Moscow’s perspective, they also help reaf-
fi rm Russia’s status as an important player in East Asia 
after a period during the 1990s when many observers 
questioned whether Russia remained a regional player.
Security Goals and Tactics
Removing obstacles to Russia’s deeper integration into 
the economically vibrant East Asian region partly ex-
plains why Russian offi cials have been seeking to reduce 
tensions on the Korean peninsula. If the DPRK can nor-
malize its relations with other countries, Russian busi-
nesses can use North Korean territory as a platform for 
realizing their regional integration objectives. Reducing 
the prospects for war on the Korean peninsula is also im-
portant for averting the incalculable economic, security, 
and other costs that arise from having a potential nuclear 
war occur on its doorstep. In January 2009, Ambassa-
dor Ivashentsov said that regional stability is “crucial 
to Russia’s economic development,” especially plans 
to increase exploitation of the natural resources located 
in Siberia and the Far East. Comparing Russian energy 
ambitions in eastern Russia with “the development of 
the American West,” he explained that “Russia needs 
security guarantees in neighboring countries” for its re-
alization.66 Nonetheless, Russian security goals and tac-
tics regarding the Koreas are multiple and, as with other 
countries, not always in harmony.
Goal No. 1: Prevent DPRK Nuclear Weapons
Russian leaders were clearly angered by Kim Jong-il’s 
defi ance of their warnings against testing a nuclear weap-
on in October 2006. On 5 February 2007, Ambassador 
Ivashentsov, complained, “the site of the nuclear test by 
the DPRK on October 9th, 2006, is situated at the distance 
of just 177 kms to our border. We do not like that. We do 
not need in the proximity of our borders neither nuclear 
and missile tests nor saber-rattling by anyone.”67 The 
Russian delegation to the six-party talks subsequently 
demanded that the DPRK dismantle its nuclear facilities 
at Yongbyon rather than simply suspend operations there 
in order to promote North Korea’s irreversible nuclear 
disarmament.68 In late May 2007, Putin signed a decree 
banning the Russian government and private institutions 
from transferring equipment, materials, or knowledge 
that the DPRK could use to develop weapons. It also 
forbade Russian citizens or institutions from engaging 
in fi nancial operations with people or entities designated 
by the UN as supporting North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
program.69 Russian strategists consider a nuclear-armed 
DPRK as posing only an indirect threat because they do 
not expect that North Korea would have reason to attack 
Russia even though many Russians sometimes worry 
about loose DPRK nuclear material or wayward North 
Korean missiles.70 Even so, “In regard to the North Ko-
rean nuclear issue,” Lee Youn-ho, South Korea’s new-
ly appointed ambassador to Russia and previously the 
country’s fi rst minister of knowledge economy, remarked 
on 10 February 2010, “there is no difference of opinion 
between Russia and our government. Russia is taking a 
stance that is very supportive of our position.”71
Goal No. 2: Suspend DPRK Missile Tests
Russian leaders have also sought to constrain North Ko-
rea’s testing of long-range ballistic missiles. Many Rus-
sians consider the DPRK missiles as posing a possible 
threat to Russian territory owing to their proximity and 
inaccuracy. In July 2006, North Korea launched seven 
missiles that landed in the Sea of Japan within Russia’s 
200-nautical-mile (370 km) exclusive economic zone.72 
One missile apparently veered off course and landed 
near the Russian port of Nakhodka.73 Russia’s most im-
portant Pacifi c Coast city and the main port of Russia’s 
Pacifi c Fleet, Vladivostok, is located only 140 kilometers 
from North Korean territory. In October 2006, the Rus-
sian delegation voted in favor of United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1718, which mandated a 
moratorium on the DPRK’s testing of ballistic missiles. 
When the DPRK made evident its preparation to resume 
missile testing in early 2009, the Russian military an-
nounced that it had deployed advanced missile defenses 
nearby to counter any DPRK missiles heading toward 
Russian territory. General Nikolai Makarov, chief of staff 
of Russia’s armed forces, even claimed to have deployed 
a division of Russia’s most advanced air defense system, 
the S-400, to the Russian Far East.74 President Medvedev 
has cited North Korea’s missile launches as well as its 
nuclear weapons tests as a “concern for us,” given that 
“we are located in close proximity to this country.”75
Goal No. 3: No Forceful Regime Change
Russian offi cials seek to change Pyongyang’s behavior, 
but not its regime. They remain more concerned about 
the potential immediate collapse of the DPRK than about 
its government’s intransigence regarding its nuclear or 
missile development programs. North Korea’s disinte-
gration could induce widespread economic disruptions 
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in East Asia, generate large refugee fl ows across Russia’s 
borders, weaken Russia’s infl uence in the Koreas by end-
ing its unique status as interlocutor with Pyongyang, and 
potentially remove a buffer zone separating Russia’s bor-
ders from U.S. ground forces based in South Korea. At 
worst, North Korea’s demise could precipitate a military 
confl ict on the peninsula, which could spill across into 
Russian territory. In addition, the substantial South Ko-
rean investment fl owing into Russia would be redirected 
toward North Korea’s rehabilitation in advance of the 
peninsula’s possible reunifi cation. Hoped-for Chinese 
investment capital would be less likely to materialize in 
this case as well. Almost any conceivable armed clash 
on the Korean peninsula would worsen Russia’s relations 
with the parties to the confl ict.
Tensions arose during the George W. Bush administra-
tion between Washington and Moscow when Russian 
leaders, like other foreign governments, feared the Unit-
ed States might resort to unilateral military action to at-
tack the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and missile programs. 
Moscow joined with Beijing and Seoul to encourage re-
straint in both Pyongyang and Washington. Russian of-
fi cials, like their Chinese and South Korean counterparts, 
oppose North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs. None-
theless, most of them—and each person naturally weighs 
the risks and likely consequences of either outcome 
differently—tend to worry more about U.S., DPRK, or 
other military actions that could engender chaos on the 
Korean peninsula than they do about the prospects of 
North Korea’s acquiring a few nuclear weapons.
Goal No. 4: Avert Cascading Proliferation
A major Russian goal in East Asia is to prevent DPRK 
actions from encouraging other countries, either through 
emulation or for defensive reasons, to pursue their own 
offensive and defensive strategic weapons, especially 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or ballistic missile 
defenses. As a matter of principle, Russian government 
representatives stress their support for the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, which legitimizes Russia’s status as 
one of the few nuclear weapons states. More pragmati-
cally, Russian policymakers have opposed North Korea’s 
acquisition of nuclear weapons for fear it might induce 
South Korea, Japan, and even Taiwan to pursue their own 
nuclear forces, which under some contingencies might 
be used against Russia. They further fear that North Ko-
rea’s ostentatious displays of its improving missile and 
nuclear capacities will encourage the United States, Ja-
pan, Taiwan, and other states to develop missile defenses 
that in turn could be used to negate Russian missiles.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made evident Russia’s 
concerns about further strategic weapons proliferation 
when he visited Seoul in April 2009. Lavrov told the 
press: “I hope that no one would . . . use the situation 
around North Korea to set up alliances, build missile de-
fense networks or announce an intention to possess nu-
clear weapons.” Alluding to Japan, he added, “Unfortu-
nately, we hear these announcements from a neighboring 
country. We think that it is unacceptable.”76 When travel-
ing to Japan a few weeks later, Prime Minister Vladimir 
Putin likewise warned: “I think it would be completely 
wrong if we heightened the emotional intensity of our 
response to the present events and used it to upset the 
situation in the region or to start an arms race. I think 
that would be the greatest possible mistake, which would 
lead us to a dead end.”77
Goal No 5: Keep Russia a Player
Russian offi cials constantly fear being shunted aside 
in the Korea peace and security dialogue despite what 
they see as Moscow’s obvious interest in the results. Al-
though the Russian Federation is a country bordering on 
the Pacifi c Ocean, few East Asians perceive it as a ma-
jor player owing to the traditionally European focus of 
Russian leaders and the weak ties linking Russia to East 
Asian economic and other integration processes. More 
generally, Russian government leaders assert that Russia 
is a great power that should be involved in any impor-
tant international security issue. For this reason, Russian 
policymakers strive to maintain a central role for the six-
party talks, a framework that, like the United Nations, 
substantiates Moscow’s claims to great-power status 
in negotiating East Asian security issues. At the end of 
2009, as on many previous occasions, Foreign Minister 
Lavrov insisted, “We consider it imperative to discuss 
all the issues that emerge [regarding the DPRK nuclear 
issue] precisely in this format.”78 Russia chairs the six-
party working group responsible for addressing regional 
security issues, a position that, should the talks make 
greater progress, would help Moscow compensate for its 
otherwise limited role in the existing security institutions 
in the Asia-Pacifi c region (which primarily comprise bi-
lateral defense and security alliances between the United 
States and key Pacifi c countries).
Russian policymakers now perceive they made a mis-
take during the 1990s during the administration of Bo-
ris Yeltsin. Eager to cultivate the then economically 
booming South Korea, they let Russia’s relations with 
the DPRK atrophy—ironically, only to see Russia’s ap-
peal to South Korea dwindle because ROK policymakers 
saw Moscow as well as Beijing as potential mediators 
with Pyongyang. The decrease in Russia’s infl uence over 
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Pyongyang meant a corresponding loss of ROK interest 
in cooperating with Moscow. Since Putin became Rus-
sia’s prime leader in late 1999, Moscow has pursued a 
policy of engaging with both Koreas to enhance its lever-
age with all parties.
Tactic No. 1: The Ukrainian Model
Some Russian analysts have explicitly advocated apply-
ing a “Ukrainian model” to the Korean nuclear crisis, 
while many others seem to support this outcome without 
using the phrase. In this scenario, the DPRK would vol-
untarily surrender its nuclear weapons in return for eco-
nomic assistance and security assurances from the other 
great powers.79 This outcome would reduce the risks of a 
military confl ict on Russia’s borders and facilitate Rus-
sia’s use of DPRK territory to deepen economic ties with 
the ROK and perhaps other countries. Russian policy-
makers would defi nitely prefer this outcome to two other 
possible scenarios—applying economic, diplomatic, and 
other nonmilitary pressure against the DPRK to induce 
it to reverse its proliferation polices, as was done with 
Libya, or employing armed intervention to seize sites of 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and replace the re-
gime, as occurred with Iraq in 2003.
In practice, major differences between the Ukrainian 
and Korean cases might make a straightforward applica-
tion of the Ukrainian model to the DPRK more diffi cult. 
Ukraine had not been a longtime nuclear aspirant like 
the DPRK. Instead, Ukraine became a nuclear weapons 
state overnight by inheriting nuclear weapons when the 
Soviet Union collapsed. In addition, Ukraine’s leaders 
did not perceive an imminent external military threat 
that nuclear weapons would help address, whereas for 
decades North Korean leaders have feared a major U.S. 
military attack.
Tactic No. 2: Moscow as Mediator
Russian policymakers highlight their important role 
regarding Korean security issues by emphasizing their 
ability to communicate with all parties thanks to their 
good relations with every player. Russian diplomacy has 
pursued a similar strategy in the Middle East, justifying 
Russia’s ties with Iran, Hamas, and other controversial 
actors by citing Moscow’s value for preserving lines of 
communication and opportunities for mediation among 
the parties in confl ict. Unfortunately, Russia has not en-
joyed suffi cient infl uence in either region to broker a 
settlement.
Putin took it upon himself to improve relations with 
North Korea after a decade of Russian neglect during the 
Yeltsin administration in the 1990s. To this end, Putin 
made a personal visit to Pyongyang in July 2000. But 
Putin suffered an embarrassment a few days later when 
he announced at the Group of Eight summit that Kim 
Jong-il had told him that North Korea would abandon its 
ballistic missile programs in return for international as-
sistance in creating a civilian space program. The DPRK 
government quickly disavowed Putin’s statement, term-
ing it a joke.80 Nonetheless, Russia has continued to seek 
a mediator role in Korea, emphasizing its stance of be-
nign neutrality regarding the tensions among the various 
parties.
On 23 April 2009, Lavrov became the fi rst foreign min-
ister from one of the six parties to visit Pyongyang since 
the DPRK had resumed testing ballistic missiles and 
withdrawn from the six-party talks. In an effort to restart 
the talks, the Russian Foreign Minister delivered a pri-
vate letter from Putin to North Korean leader Kim Jong-
il, who declined to meet with Lavrov.81 The Russian for-
eign minister then went to South Korea, where he told the 
press that Russia was prepared to launch DPRK satellites 
on Russian rockets, a service Russia was already provid-
ing ROK satellites.82 Russian diplomats subsequently 
stressed that they were in contact with all the other par-
ties in their effort to resume the talks. Telling the Rus-
sian media that “communication channels have not been 
cut off and it would be strange if this happened,” Deputy 
Foreign Minister Alexei Borodavkin said that Russian 
diplomats were holding consultations through both the 
DPRK embassy in Moscow and the Russian embassy in 
Pyongyang. Adding that he had also talked with senior 
ROK, U.S., and Japanese offi cials, Borodavkin added, 
“We are thinking of how to fi nd the way out of this dead-
lock situation and hold consultations with partners and 
want to discover opportunities to resume the talks.”83
Perhaps Russia’s most successful intervention to further 
the talks came when the Russian government played a 
decisive role in overcoming a major deadlock in the de-
nuclearization process by helping North Korea recover 
$25 million deposited in Macao’s Banco Delta Asia. The 
bank froze the funds in September 2005 after U.S. author-
ities designated the money as illegal profi ts gained from 
counterfeiting and money laundering and sanctioned the 
bank. The DPRK conditioned its implementation of the 
February 2005 denuclearization agreement closing its 
main nuclear reactor at Yongbyon on its recovering this 
money, but no Western bank would participate in the 
transaction for fear of incurring U.S. fi nancial sanctions. 
After receiving guarantees of immunity from the United 
States, Russian offi cials arranged for the funds to reach 
the DPRK in June 2007 via the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York, the Central Bank of Russia, and Russia’s Far 
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Eastern Commercial Bank (Dalkombank), where North 
Korea had an account.84
Tactic No. 3: Dialogue Rather Than Punishment
Russian diplomats generally oppose using sanctions to 
punish countries whose governments misbehave. In the 
case of the DPRK, as with Iran, Russian policymakers 
argue that a non-coercive, incentive-based strategy offers 
the best means for persuading North Korea to denucle-
arize. After the October 2006 DPRK nuclear test, Putin 
declared it was important not to back North Korea into a 
corner and leave it with no option but to raise tensions—
the same argument he regularly makes regarding Iran.85 
Russian policymakers also strove to break the escalating 
tensions in early 2009 when the DPRK government was 
preparing to launch a rocket and threatened retaliation 
if the UN sanctioned it in response.86 While seeking to 
dissuade a DPRK rocket launch, Russian offi cials also 
argued against sanctioning Pyongyang further on the 
grounds that additional sanctions would drive the DPRK 
government into deeper and aggressive alienation, scut-
tling hopes for early implementation of its denucleariza-
tion commitments.
After the DPRK went ahead with the launches, Medve-
dev argued that, although Russia has supported interna-
tional sanctions against Pyongyang for its nuclear tests 
and missile launches, “that does not mean that we must 
continually infl ame passions. On the contrary, we must 
seek ways and approaches to convince our North Korean 
colleagues to talk to us, because I don’t want to be forced 
to imagine any other course of events,” adding that—
in an allusion to the DPRK’s nuclear capabilities—“if 
something does happen, it will be the worst scenario, 
the most appalling one we can imagine.” For this reason, 
he concluded, “there is no alternative to a dialogue with 
North Korea. We need to use every possible means.”87
The Russian Foreign Ministry issued a sharp note of con-
demnation after North Korea detonated another nuclear 
weapon on 25 May 2009. The statement called the test a 
“violation” of previous Security Council resolutions and 
a “serious blow” to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. 
It also complained that “the latest DPRK moves are pro-
voking an escalation of tension in Northeast Asia.”88 For-
eign Minister Lavrov advocated the adoption of a strong-
ly condemnatory UN Security Council resolution, but he 
opposed adopting further sanctions or other punishment 
for punishment’s sake; instead he endorsed a resumption 
of the six-party talks. “We should not look to punish for 
the sake of punishment only. . . . The problem can only 
be settled through talks.”89
Tactic No. 4: Limited Sanctions
Russian offi cials perceive applying limited sanctions on 
the DPRK as a “lesser evil” between doing nothing and 
imposing more severe sanctions or using force. They 
have sought to keep sanctions limited to meet the de-
mands from the other players to pressure North Korea 
while not driving Pyongyang into belligerence. As one 
of the fi ve permanent UN Security Council members, 
Russia can exercise a veto in the Security Council. Mos-
cow has blocked proposed resolutions imposing severe 
sanctions on the DPRK or authorizing the use of force to 
enforce DPRK compliance with UNSC resolutions. But 
Russian policymakers have supported some penalties in 
order to keep the UN and Russia as central players in 
the international response to the Korean issue. Russian 
diplomats fear a repeat of the Kosovo (1998) and Iraq 
(2003) examples, when Western governments decided 
to bypass the UN and employ force on their own initia-
tive through coalitions of the willing after they could not 
work through the UNSC owing to Moscow’s veto. Rus-
sian diplomats must balance blocking harsh UN sanc-
tions while sustaining Western interests and aspirations 
that working through the UN remains a fruitful tactic.
In response to the DPRK’s nuclear test on 9 October 
2006, the UNSC enacted Resolution 1718 on 14 Octo-
ber. The text condemned North Korea’s nuclear test and 
banned the transfer of items related to the DPRK’s nucle-
ar, ballistic missile, and other unconventional weapons 
programs. UNSCR 1718 also freezes the foreign assets 
and prohibits international travel of those individuals 
involved in the DPRK’s nuclear, ballistic missile, and 
other WMD programs, along with their family members. 
Additional provisions prohibit the transfer of major con-
ventional weapons systems—such as attack helicopters, 
combat aircraft, tanks, and warships—as well as luxury 
goods to North Korea. To enforce its provisions, UNSCR 
1718 gave countries the right to inspect cargo moving to 
and from North Korea. Despite the efforts of the United 
States and Japan to enact a more strongly worded reso-
lution, Russia and China excluded language that might 
authorize UN members to enforce resolution provisions 
with military action.90 The Russian and Chinese delega-
tions insisted that the resolution aim less to punish North 
Korea retroactively than to modify its future policies.
Russia also joined with China to moderate the sanctions 
imposed after the DPRK’s April 2009 long-range ballis-
tic missile test. After what the DPRK termed its “space 
rocket” apparently fell harmlessly into the sea, the Rus-
sian delegation to the Security Council engaged in tough 
negotiations with the other permanent UNSC members 
over how to respond. Eventually, delegation members 
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decided that the rotating president of the UNSC for that 
month, Ambassador Claude Heller of Mexico, could is-
sue a statement that termed the launch a “contravention” 
of UNSCR 1718, which forbids the DPRK from engag-
ing in missile-related activities.91 The United States and 
Japan had initially sought another formal UNSC reso-
lution that imposed immediate penalties on the DPRK, 
but Russia opposed such a move. The Russian delegation 
also tried to delay efforts to tighten the existing sanctions 
in order to avert a further escalation of tensions and in-
stead coax Pyongyang back to the negotiating table.92 
Tactic No. 5: Joint Statements
Another way Russia has affi rmed its role in the Korean 
nuclear talks is by referring to the nuclear issue in its 
joint statements with the other six-party-talks members. 
By making such joint declarations, Russia’s dialogue 
partners affi rm Moscow’s role as a legitimate player on 
the Korea issue. The overlapping perspectives in Mos-
cow and Beijing on many Korean security issues make 
China a favorite Russian partner in this enterprise. In 
their June 2009 joint statement, for example, the Russian 
and Chinese governments devoted several paragraphs 
to their “grave concern over the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula.” The two governments called for a peace-
ful resolution of the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear 
weapons within the framework of the six-party talks.93
Russian and U.S. leaders have cited their cooperation in 
managing the North Korean nuclear dispute as evidence 
that, despite their many bilateral differences, the two 
governments can continue to work together in solving 
important international security issues.94 In their April 
2008 Strategic Framework Declaration, for instance, 
presidents Putin and Bush reaffi rmed their commitment 
to the six-party talks, the implementation of UNSCR 
1718, and “the ultimate goals of the denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula.”95 In their joint security statement 
the following year, presidents Medvedev and Obama 
expressed their mutual support for “the continuation of 
the six-party talks at an early date.” They also “agreed 
to continue to pursue the verifi able denuclearization of 
the Korean Peninsula in accordance with purposes and 
principles of the 19 September 2005, Joint Statement and 
subsequent consensus documents.”96
Tactic No. 6: No Double Standards
While criticizing the DPRK for testing nuclear weapons 
and long-range ballistic missiles, Russian government 
representatives have also faulted Western countries for 
failing to meet their previous commitments to the DPRK, 
implying that this failure might have precipitated the 
subsequent North Korean behavior. In September 2008, 
Lavrov chastised Japan’s government for failing to render 
its share of economic assistance to the DPRK on account 
of its bilateral dispute regarding the Japanese citizens 
abducted by North Korean intelligence agents between 
1977 and 1983.97 Russian offi cials also criticized Wash-
ington when Moscow considered U.S. negotiating tac-
tics excessively infl exible.98 When in Pyongyang in April 
2009, Lavrov called on all parties to fulfi ll the existing 
agreements, arguing that “if everybody takes such a 
stand, we will be able to get through the crisis.”99 Georgy 
Toloraya, program director of the Russian Academy of 
Science’s Korean Institute of Economics, argues, “The 
current cycle of tensions leading to the emergence of the 
DPRK as a de-facto nuclear weapons state started when 
. . . North Koreans grew frustrated as their actual gains 
from the diplomatic process were marginal—they did not 
come much closer to obtaining substantial security guar-
antees.” As a result, “Kim Jong Il probably considered 
that the incoming Obama administration would not take 
North Korea seriously enough” unless a “strategy of in-
creasing tensions to raise the stakes was adopted.”100
Future Possibilities
In the near term, Moscow will play an essential role in 
determining what economic sanctions might be imposed 
on the DPRK—owing to both its own authoritative status 
as a veto-wielding member of the UNSC and also the dy-
namics of the Russia-China relationship on the Security 
Council. The PRC government has traditionally avoided 
being isolated on international security issues, including 
voting in the UNSC. If Moscow does not block a UNSC 
resolution, Beijing will almost always abstain rather than 
cast the sole veto 
Russia’s infl uence could also help shape the current de-
bate over whether to continue adhering to the principle 
of “commitment for commitment, action for action” that 
has been the basis of the six-party talks.101 This approach 
expected that the other parties would provide the DPRK 
with discrete rewards for each concrete step Pyongyang 
took toward denuclearization. Although this process of 
reciprocal concessions was supposed to yield mutually 
reinforcing improvements, it frequently worked in the 
reverse. When the DPRK or its negotiating parties took 
some objectionable action, the others would retaliate, 
leading to a series of tit-for-tat exchanges that soon undid 
earlier progress. 
More recently, some of the participating governments, 
especially South Korea’s, have been seeking a “grand 
bargain” that would have the DPRK immediately end its 
nuclear and ballistic missile programs in return for the 
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other parties providing a comprehensive range of eco-
nomic assistance, diplomatic initiatives, and security 
assurances to North Korea.102 Like those advocating a 
comprehensive settlement to the Israel-Palestine dispute, 
some negotiators hope that it will prove easier and faster 
to agree to a broad package deal that entails explicit trade-
offs than to negotiate a multitude of specifi c issues in iso-
lation. They also anticipate that such a framework could 
build on areas of greater mutual interest, such as energy 
security and economic development, rather than focus 
almost exclusively on the issue of eliminating North Ko-
rea’s nuclear weapons. In early February 2010, Konstan-
tin Vnukov, who became Russia’s ambassador to South 
Korea a few months earlier, declared his government’s 
readiness to accelerate various DPRK-related economic 
projects as Moscow’s contribution to ROK President Lee 
Myung-bak’s “Grand Bargain” proposal. Without going 
into details, Vnukov mentioned the proposed gas pipe-
lines and railways that might traverse North Korea.103
Furthermore, as Russia and the United States look for 
areas of cooperation to reset their relationship, the Ko-
rean peninsula offers certain advantages. Unlike in the 
case of Iran, where certain Russian interest groups per-
ceive benefi ts from continuing tensions between Tehran 
and the West, or in Afghanistan, where cross-pressured 
interests also prevail along with a certain schadenfreude 
among Russian leaders, Moscow and Washington share 
the same long-term vision for the Koreas: a non-nuclear 
and peaceful region integrated into the global economy 
as an important transit zone and industrial center.
A key issue is reconciling the sometimes confl icting 
stances of Russia and the United States regarding how 
best to realize their common goals. Perhaps the most 
fundamental difference is that, whereas most U.S. of-
fi cials would accept some instability—including the 
DPRK’s collapse and Korean reunifi cation—to prevent 
the DPRK from becoming a nuclear weapons state, Rus-
sian policymakers generally would prefer the status quo 
to the disorders that would accompany regime change in 
the DPRK. But Russian policy makers may differ from 
their Chinese counterparts in that they generally would 
welcome Korea’s peaceful reunifi cation since it would 
reduce the risk of war in northeast Asia and facilitate 
the building of trans-Korean pipelines, railways, and the 
other commercial arteries that would integrate the Rus-
sian Far East more deeply into the prosperous East Asian 
economic region.
Another Russia-America difference might arise should 
the sides proceed to negotiate a Korean peace agreement 
to replace the current armistice. The current U.S. position 
appears to be that the parties to the negotiations should 
be the two Koreas, China, and the United States. Russian 
policymakers would not welcome exclusion from the 
peace talks given their security interests in the outcome 
and Moscow’s general aspiration to play a prominent 
role in East Asian affairs.
That said, Russian decision makers might be willing to 
make concessions regarding the Koreas in return for dip-
lomatic gains affecting issues Moscow considers more 
important—such as European security and Georgia.104 
Russia’s current leaders often think in terms of spheres of 
infl uence and geopolitical trade-offs. U.S. political dis-
course abhors the use of such terms although U.S. diplo-
macy sometimes accepts their existence in practice (for 
example, the divisions of Europe and Korea during the 
Cold War). In any case, the current U.S. administration 
seems uninterested in pursuing policies aimed directly at 
regime change given the risks of unintended consequenc-
es and a lack of regional support for confrontational poli-
cies, so Russia and the United States can pursue paral-
lel policies that could encourage the DPRK’s long-term 
evolution into a less disruptive state while constraining 
its belligerent tendencies in the interim. Russian policy-
makers might privately welcome the irony of practicing 
Cold War–style containment toward a communist Ko-
rean state in partnership with the United States.
If the DPRK’s mellowing is ever realized, Russia might 
contribute its nuclear expertise to assist with restruc-
turing North Korea’s nuclear energy program in more 
peaceful directions. Russia’s leading capabilities in outer 
space research and space propulsion technologies would 
also position Moscow well to help redirect the DPRK 
missile program, perhaps in partnership with the ROK, 
which is collaborating with Russia to develop its own 
space launch vehicles and expertise. Moscow has al-
ready signaled its readiness to assist the DPRK’s space 
research program as an incentive contributing to the ces-
sation of North Korean missile launches. North Korean 
offi cials might in turn feel more comfortable allowing 
Russian offi cials, rather than representatives of Western 
governments or other bodies, to monitor and assist with 
the restructuring of their nuclear and missile programs.
If the DPRK were to collapse, Chinese leaders might 
prefer to see Russian forces occupy North Korea to 
lock down the country’s WMD assets and provide hu-
manitarian assistance rather than use Chinese forces for 
that purpose or accept a northward deployment of U.S. 
troops that would eliminate the buffer zone separating 
them from the Chinese mainland. PRC representatives 
refuse to discuss such contingencies with Americans or 
South Koreans for fear of annoying the DPRK, but they 
could more securely communicate their thoughts through 
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Russian security experts, who could then transmit them 
to U.S. and ROK interlocutors. This communication pro-
cess could also work profi tably in reverse to ensure that 
PRC offi cials are prepared for how the United States, 
the ROK, and perhaps Japan might respond to regime 
change or collapse in North Korea.
Another possible scenario could be a joint Russia-China 
military occupation of the DPRK should the regime in 
Pyongyang collapse. In such an eventuality, other coun-
tries might contemplate moving military forces into 
North Korea to avert a humanitarian disaster (which 
could include a massive fl ight of refugees into neighbor-
ing Chinese and Russian territory as well as South Ko-
rea) and secure the DPRK’s nuclear explosive devices 
and other weapons before they could fall into the hands 
of terrorists, criminals, or other rogue regimes. Moscow 
and Beijing might want to occupy the territory fi rst rather 
than allow U.S. forces to move so close to their borders. 
A joint occupation might also occur if neither Russia nor 
China felt comfortable allowing the other to dominate 
the peninsula through unilateral occupation. Moscow 
and Beijing have employed such a condominium model 
in Central Asia, within the framework of the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization, to moderate their concerns 
about the other’s regional aspirations.
Russia and China have already conducted a war game 
that could provide a dress rehearsal of such a joint oc-
cupation. In August 2005, Russia and China practiced a 
major military exercise, Peace Mission 2005, near North 
Korea. It was unprecedented in the history of relations 
between Beijing and Moscow and involved a three-phase 
operation that began in Vladivostok and then moved to 
China’s Shandong peninsula, where the participants con-
ducted ground operations followed by amphibious ma-
neuvers.105 While the Chinese supplied most of the troops 
(8,000 compared with Russia’s 2,000), the Russians pro-
vided the most sophisticated equipment, including Rus-
sian Tu-160 and Tu-95 strategic bombers as well as some 
140 warships.106 The maneuvers practiced during Peace 
Mission 2005 included neutralizing antiaircraft defenses, 
enforcing a maritime blockade, and conducting an am-
phibious assault and other joint maritime operations.107
Finally, the Russian chair of the six-party working group 
responsible for addressing regional security issues, Dep-
uty Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov, declared his 
government’s long-term objective of establishing a more 
permanent institution than the six-party talks to address 
Northeast Asian security issues.108 Thus far, the stale-
mated talks have prevented the parties from considering 
these longer-term issues. But it would be good for Rus-
sia and the other parties, naturally dispirited by current 
tensions, to keep thinking about the hopeful opportuni-
ties for securing Northeast Asia’s security and prosperity 
in coming years once they have surmounted the present 
crisis.
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